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Abstract. Some years ago, Juels et al. introduced the first coercion-resistant In-
ternet voting protocol. Its basic concept is still the most viable approach to ad-
dress voter coercion and vote selling in Internet voting. However, one of the main
open issues is its unrealistic computational requirements of the quadratic-time
tallying procedure. In this paper, we examine the cause of this issue, namely the
authorization of votes, and summarize the most recent proposals to perform this
step in linear time. We explain the key underlying concepts of these proposals and
introduce a new protocol based on anonymity sets. The size of these anonymity
sets serves as an adjustable security parameter, which determines the degree of
coercion-resistance. The main advantage of the new protocol is to move compu-
tational complexity introduced in recent works from the voter side to the tallying
authority side.
1 Introduction
Remote voting over the Internet gains increasing attention as many governments aim
at providing their citizens with electronic voting services. Although tremendous effort
was put in research to understand the various aspects involved in electronic voting, no
widely accepted solution to overcome all the security problems has been presented so
far. One particular problem, namely voter coercion, was introduced in 2005 by Juels
et al. in [13]. They propose a coercion-resistant Internet voting protocol to which we
will simply refer as JCJ. Their protocol has been widely discussed and examined in the
literature, and its basic concept still seems to be the most viable solution to address the
voter coercion and vote selling problems. As appealing the approach may look in theory,
it leaves some critical issues unanswered, for example the board-flooding problem or
the quadratic running time of the tallying procedure. As we will not address the board-
flooding problem in this paper, we refer to some of the most recent proposals in the
literature [14].
This paper deals with the latter problem, i.e., the quadratic running time of the tal-
lying procedure. We particularly focus on the two main building blocks of JCJ-based
protocols, namely the elimination of duplicate votes and the detection of fake votes.
These components are responsible for the expensive computations during tallying. To-
gether with the elimination of invalid votes (those with invalid zero-knowledge proofs),
we generally refer to these steps as vote authorization. We propose a modified protocol
based on anonymity sets to address the efficiency problems of these building blocks
and compare our protocol to some recent proposals for efficient vote authorization. In
comparison with the closest recent protocol [6, 7], our approach is more expensive for
the tallying authorities, but less expensive for voters. We consider this as an important
property, because the computational resources on the voters’ side are usually limited
(e.g. in Internet voting, low-power devices or slow interpreted languages might be used
by voters).
In Section 2, we first introduce the JCJ protocol, its critical building blocks, and
recent improvements. In Section 3, we propose a modified protocol for efficient vote
authorization. We compare the performance of our approach to existing protocols in
Section 4. Finally, we summarize our conclusions and suggest some future work in
Section 5.
2 Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting
Coercion-resistant Internet voting protocols follow in general the phases depicted in
Figure 1. Prior to any voting event, eligible voters must register with the authority to
get their credentials for participating at future elections. This phase is individual for
the voters and usually carried out only once for a number of subsequent voting events.
For every election, the following phases are repeatedly performed: election setup, vote
casting, vote authorization, tallying. Note that some protocols allow to partly carry out
vote authorization already during the vote casting phase.
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Fig. 1. Phases of coercion-resistant Internet voting protocols.
While efficient and scalable solutions exist for most of the above phases, the vote au-
thorization phase—as proposed by JCJ—requires computing capacities which grow
quadratically in the number of votes cast. In a large-scale election setting such as nation-
wide parliamentary elections, this leads to unrealistic performance requirements. In the
following, we explain the vote authorization phase in more detail, and then we provide
a summary of the original JCJ protocol and of some recently proposed improvements.
2.1 Vote Authorization
Voting from a remote private place is inherently problematic with respect to privacy,
because no privacy-preserving voting booth is used to protect it. Therefore, other mea-
sures must be taken to protect voters from coercion and to prevent vote selling. The
main measures for this in JCJ are (a) the ability of coerced voters to create and cast fake
votes, the coercer cannot distinguish from valid votes, and (b) the ability for voters to
cast multiple votes, of which only one will be counted. Hence, various types of unau-
thorized votes may appear in the electronic ballot box and must thus be excluded before
tallying. In some protocol descriptions, this phase is called pre-tallying phase, whereas
sometimes it is implicitly included in the tallying phase. We call it vote authorization
phase, which consists of the following three consecutive vote elimination steps:
Invalid Votes Elimination. The ballots created and cast by the voters usually include
cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs for various purposes, for example for the correct
construction of the encryptions, the correctness of the selected candidate choices, or
the knowledge of the plaintexts. In the first step of the vote authorization phase, the
authorities verify the validity of the proofs to exclude ballots with invalid proofs from
further processing.
Duplicate Votes Elimination. In the second step, among all ballots that were cast with
the same credential, exactly one is chosen for further processing according to some
policy. In the “last-vote-counts” policy, for example, the last valid vote cast is selected
to be included in the tallying, whereas all other votes from the same credential are
excluded from further processing. This enforces the “one-voter-one-vote” principle.
Fake Votes Elimination. To conclude the vote authorization phase, all remaining fake
votes have to be detected and removed. For this, the authorities need to check whether
or not the ballots include credentials from eligible voters. Only the ballots passing this
test are kept for the final tallying. Note that before eliminating fake votes, they must be
unlinked from the actual votes cast. Otherwise, a coercer or vote buyer could easily de-
tect the voter’s attempt of not fulfilling the demands. The unlinking is usually achieved
by shuffling the votes in a verifiable (re-encryption) mix-net.
2.2 The JCJ Protocol
In the following paragraphs, we briefly explain the phases of the JCJ protocol. Since
we focus on the main building blocks, we settle for a semi-formal style of exposi-
tion. In particular, we do not thoroughly explain well-known cryptographic techniques.
Furthermore, we assume the application of publicly verifiable group threshold mecha-
nisms whenever registering or tallying authorities perform joint computations, even if
the text might suggest a single entity. All ciphertexts are ElGamal encryptions over a
pre-established multiplicative cyclic group (Gq, ·, 1) of order q, for which the decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem (DDHP) is assumed to be hard. Note that the authors of the JCJ
protocol propose a modified version of ElGamal encryption for their formal proofs to
work. The discussion in this paper is based on a simplified version with ordinary ElGa-
mal encryptions as it is used by CIVITAS [9].
Registration. The registrars establish the random credential σ ∈ Gq and pass it to the
voter via an untappable channel. Additionally, they append a public credential, i.e.,
a randomized encryption S = Encε(σ, αS) of σ, to the voter’s entry in the public
voter roll, which is part of a public bulletin board. Value αS denotes the encryption’s
randomness, and ε stands for the tallying authorities’ common public key. Assuming a
majority of trustworthy registrars, in the end only the voter will know σ and no one will
know αS .
Vote Casting. The voter identifies a choice c from the available set of valid choices (or
candidates) C. To cast the vote, the encryptionsA = Encε(σ, αA) andB = Encε(c, αB)
are posted to the public bulletin board, via an anonymous channel. The pair (A,B) must
be accompanied by two non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKP), one to prove
knowledge of σ and one to prove c ∈ C. Requiring the first proof prevents attackers
from casting unauthorized votes by re-encrypting entries from the voter roll (recall that
αS is not known to anyone). Since each authorized vote on the voting board will be de-
crypted during the tallying phase, the second proof is needed to prevent coercers from
forcing voters to select c 6∈ C according to some prescribed pattern, thus obtaining a
receipt as described in [10].
To circumvent coercion, the voter can deceive the coercer by posting a fake vote
to the voting board. To do so, the voter simply claims some arbitrary σ′ ∈ Gq to be
the proper credential and uses it to compute A. The encrypted vote B is computed
according to the coercer’s preference and the plaintexts of A and B are revealed to
justify compliance. Alternatively, the voter can even let the coercer compute A and B
and cast the vote using σ′.
Vote Authorization. At the end of the vote casting phase, the voting board contains a
certain number N of votes cast, of which not all might make it to the final tally. First,
the authorities verify all NIZKPs that were cast along with the votes. If a proof does not
hold for a vote (A,B), it is marked accordingly and excluded from further processing
(invalid votes elimination). Then the tallying authorities need to filter out votes that were
cast multiple times with a proper credential (duplicate votes elimination) and votes that
were cast with a fake credential (fake votes elimination). For both tasks, the authors
of JCJ propose the application of plaintext equivalence tests (PET) [11]. Given two
ElGamal encryptions X = Encε(x, αX) and Y = Encε(y, αY ), the group threshold
algorithm PET(X,Y ) returns true for x = y and false for x 6= y, without revealing
any information on x or y.4
4 A common way of performing PET in a homomorphic encryption scheme is to check whether
the decryption of (X/Y )z equals 1 for some random value z.
Tallying. At the end, i.e., after eliminating all unauthorized votes, all remaining votes
are jointly decrypted and counted. The final result is published.
2.3 Improvements of the JCJ Protocol
Several proposals for improving the quadratic running-time of the tallying procedure in
JCJ exist in the recent literature. In this subsection, we give a short overview of these
developments. Two of them will be described in more details, as some of their ideas
will re-appear in the description of our contribution in Section 3.
Smith, Weber [17, 19, 20]. Instead of applying PET(Ai, Aj), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , on all
pairs of distinct ciphertexts for removing duplicates, both Smith and Weber suggested
computing and decrypting Az1 = Encε(σ
z
1), . . . , A
z
N = Encε(σ
z
N ), where z is a ran-
dom value shared among the tallying authorities. The resulting blinded values σzi are
stored in a hash table for collision detection in linear time. Clearly, σi = σj whenever
σzi = σ
z
j . In addition to eliminating duplicate votes, both authors propose using the
same procedure for eliminating fake votes. In that case, however, based on the fact that
the same exponent z is used across all ciphertexts, the coercer gets an attack strategy
to identify whether a vote with known σ is counted [2, 9, 15]. Note that this attack does
not apply to the elimination of duplicate votes.
Araujo et al. [1–4]. To solve the efficiency problem of the JCJ scheme, Araujo et al.
suggest an approach based on group signatures. At registration, voters obtain their cre-
dentials. Unlike JCJ, no public values are related to voter roll entries. Their credentials
enable the voters to deduce invalid credentials and mislead coercers. If the provided
proofs hold, duplicates on the voting board are publicly identifiable by the equality of
two values that are cast along with the vote. After mixing the relevant values on the
voting board, the tallying authorities use their private keys to identify the legitimate
votes. Notably, all information on their legitimacy is sent along with the vote itself, but
can only be assessed by a sufficiently large group of tallying authorities. Fully avoiding
plaintext equivalence tests between cast values and voter roll entries summarizes the
essence of this elegant approach to avoid the inefficient comparison procedure.
An inherent weakness of this approach is the fact that a majority of colluding regis-
trars could compute valid (but illegitimate) credentials unnoticed. As described earlier,
adding illegitimate votes to the tally in JCJ requires the knowledge of a credential σ that
complies with an entry S in the voter roll, i.e., such attacks could easily be detected.
This is not the case in Araujo et al.’s scheme. Nevertheless, we believe that the approach
holds much potential.
Spycher et al. [18]. This protocol strongly relates to the original JCJ protocol. For
removing duplicates, they suggest using the linear-time scheme proposed by Smith and
Weber. For fake vote elimination, they suggest preserving the use of the voter roll.
The key to better efficiency lies in requiring voters to indicate which voter roll entry
their vote (A,B) relates to. Tallying authorities then apply PET only on respective
re-encryptions of A and S, where S is the public credential copied from the indicated
voter roll entry. To preserve privacy, a certain number of fake votes is introduced by
the authorities for each voter roll entry. This allows voters to deny the fact of having
submitted their vote. Vote authorization thus becomes linear over the total number of
submitted votes. More details on each steps of this protocol are given below.
Registration. The registration step is conducted according to JCJ. Additionally, it is
assumed that a distinct public number, for example the index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} of the
voter’s entry in the voter roll, is assigned to each voter.
Vote Casting. To cast a vote, the voters perform the same steps as in JCJ. In addition
to the values A and B along with corresponding proofs, the value C = Encε(i, αC),
accompanied by a NIZKP to prove knowledge of i, is posted to the bulletin board.
The authorities later use i to locate the public credential S on the voter roll and thus
to perform a single PET to efficiently eliminate fake votes. Note that the voting board
must also accept encryptions C of values different from the voter’s public number i.
Vote Authorization. After excluding votes with invalid proofs, the authorities add a
random number βi of additional fake votes for each voter (let β denote the average
number of additional votes per voter). After duplicate elimination by applying Smith’s
and Weber’s scheme on values A, the resulting adjusted list is passed as input to a first
re-encryption mix-net, which outputs tuples (A′, B′, C ′). Next, the authorities decrypt
C ′ to extract i and establish a list of tuples (A′, B′, S). Votes for which the decryption
renders an invalid index i 6∈ {1, . . . , n} are excluded from further processing. The
remaining tuples are passed to a second re-encryption mix-net, which outputs tuples
(A′′, B′′, S′). Now the tallying authorities perform PET(A′′, S′) for each tuple. If the
algorithm returns false , which is the case for all fake votes, the tuple is marked to be
excluded from further processing.
Tallying. At the end, the tallying authorities jointly decrypt the valuesB′′ of all remain-
ing votes and publish the result.
Selections [6, 7]. Although SELECTIONS is based on JCJ, the approach presented by
Clark and Hengartner has a slightly different setting. We will shortly summarize its
phases and point out the differences.
Registration. The public credential is not an encryption of the voter’s credential σ, but
an encryption of gσ for a publicly known generator g, i.e., S = Encε(gσ, αS).
Election Setup. For every election, the public credentials are re-randomized into S′ =
Encε(gˆ
σ, αS′), where gˆ = gα is a fresh generator and αS′ = αS ·α the new randomiza-
tion for a random (but unknown) value α. The fresh generator gˆ is also used for casting
votes. This mechanism prevents information leakage across elections.
Vote Casting. When casting a vote, the voter sends a commitment A = gˆσ , the en-
crypted vote B = Encε(c, αB), and a re-encryption of the public credential C =
ReEncε(S
′, αC) to the public bulletin board. Additionally, an anonymity set containing
S′ and β−1 randomly chosen public credentials different from S′ is selected. Then the
voter constructs a NIZKP to prove that C is a re-encryption of one of the β public cre-
dentials in the anonymity set. This proof together with a proof of knowledge of σ and a
proof of well-formedness for c ∈ C are added to the ballot.
Vote Authorization. Similarly to JCJ, the tallying authorities first verify the proofs re-
lated to the submitted votes. If a proof does not hold for a vote, it is marked and ex-
cluded from further processing, i.e., invalid votes are eliminated. This can be performed
during the vote casting phase, in particular at the moment the individual ballots arrive
on the public bulletin board. The detection and elimination of duplicate votes follows
from the simple fact that votes with the same credential will have the same commitment
A = gˆσ . In that case, only one vote is kept for further processing (according to some
policy). After eliminating duplicate votes, the remaining tuples (A,B,C) are mixed
and re-encrypted (the commitment A is treated as an encryption with randomness 0)
into (A′, B′, C ′). For fake vote elimination, a simple PET between A′ and C ′ is per-
formed. If PET(A′, C ′) returns false , which is the case for all fake votes, the vote is
marked and excluded from further processing.
Tallying. At the end, all remaining votes B′ are jointly decrypted and tallied. The final
result is published.
3 A New Protocol Based on Anonymity Sets
Similar to the protocols of Spycher et al. and SELECTIONS, our protocol strongly re-
lates to the original JCJ protocol. For eliminating duplicate votes, we propose using
the linear-time scheme of Smith and Weber, and for fake votes elimination, we suggest
linking the vote to the voter roll. Instead of explicitly introducing fake votes by the au-
thorities, we require the voter to specify an anonymity set of voters, similar to the one in
SELECTIONS. The difference is that in our protocol, the voter only claims to be one of
β voters without any proof for this claim. In contrast to SELECTIONS, the voter is thus
not required to construct an expensive zero-knowledge proof during vote casting. In the
vote authorization phase, the authorities replicate every submitted ballot into β ballots,
one for each voter in the anonymity set. In other words, every submitted proper ballot
leads to one authorized vote and β − 1 implicit fake votes. The protocol can therefore
be regarded as a synthesis between SELECTIONS and the protocol of Spycher et al.,
where β, the size of the anonymity sets, constitutes an adjustable security parameter
that determines the degree of coercion-resistance. More details on this idea are given in
the subsequent description of the protocol. An overview of the protocol is depicted in
Figure 2.
3.1 Protocol Description
In our description of the protocol, we follow the same style of exposition and nota-
tion as for the protocols described in Section 2. As many elements strongly relate to
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Fig. 2. Overview of the new protocol with some details about the vote authorization phase.
the original JCJ protocol and its successors, we will not explain everything again in
comprehensive detail. Note that our protocol, in contrast with SELECTIONS, does not
require a particular election setup phase.
Registration. The registration step is conducted according to Spycher et al. It is thus
assumed that a distinct public number, for example the index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} of the
voter’s entry in the voter roll, is assigned to each voter.
Vote Casting. To cast a vote, the voter performs the same steps as in JCJ. Additionally
to posting values A and B along with corresponding proofs, a subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
of size β is chosen at random and added to the ballot. This is the ballot’s anonymity
set, which must include the voter’s own index i to become a vote that counts. Since the
voting board is a public bulletin board, the voter is able to individually verify that the
vote has been cast as intended and recorded as cast.
Vote Authorization. In a first step, all votes with invalid proofs are marked to be ex-
cluded from further processing. Then duplicate votes are eliminated by applying Smith’s
and Weber’s scheme on values A. Next, the authorities create β new ballots (A,B, Sj)
for every submitted ballot and for every j ∈ I in the corresponding anonymity set.
These ballots are published on the voting board and thus, the correct construction
is universally verifiable. The adjusted list of ballots is passed as input to a verifi-
able re-encryption mix-net, which outputs tuples (A′, B′, S′j). Now the authorities per-
form PET(A′, S′j) for each tuple. All ballots for which the algorithm returns false are
marked and excluded from further processing.
Tallying. The remaining unmarked ballots are authorized as legitimate votes and for
every such ballot, B′ is jointly decrypted and counted.
AA
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A B Si
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...
...
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Fig. 3. The ballot replication step for one submitted ballot.
3.2 Security
Our protocol strongly relates to SELECTIONS and generally the same security consid-
erations apply to our protocol. We do neither argue about the registration phase that
corresponds to the original JCJ protocol nor about the final talling phase, which essen-
tially consists of decrypting the authorized ballots and counting them.5 In the following,
we will briefly explain how vote casting and vote authorization in our protocol relates
to SELECTIONS and recap the security considerations of SELECTIONS with respect to
the security parameter β.
Vote Casting. As it is the case for every coercion-resistant voting protocol, the voter
must have one moment of privacy to cast the real vote. Hence, the coercer can only
observe the public bulletin board to check for the voter’s compliance. During the vote
casting phase, the public bulletin board reveals the same information to a coercer as
it is the case for SELECTIONS. Particularly, the coercer knows the number of votes
associated with each voter. The greater the security parameter β, the more likely the
coerced voter’s index occurs in someone else’s anonymity set and thus the less certain
the coercer will be regarding the voter’s compliance.
Vote Authorization. The coercer does not get additional information on whether the vote
will be tallied or not from observing the elimination of invalid votes. The next step, the
elimination of duplicate votes using the technique of Smith and Weber is the same as
in the scheme of Spycher et al. and is similar to SELECTIONS, i.e., the same security
considerations apply. The ballot replication step is different to all existing approaches.
However, the straightforward inflation of the submitted ballots with the indices of the
anonymity set is public and does obviously not reveal any additional information to
the coercer. The last step of the vote authorization phase, the mixing of the remaining
ballots and the elimination of fake votes, is again the same as in Spycher et al. and
SELECTIONS, i.e., the same security arguments apply here. In particular, because of the
5 The security properties of the tallying phase depend on the encryption scheme that is used and
is not related to the security properties of our protocol (as long as the encryption scheme allows
verifiable mixing and does not allow the coercer to link the cast vote to the mixed ballots).
fact that the coercer cannot link the eliminated ballots to the initial votes, no information
is leaked to the coercer on whether the coerced voter’s fake vote was finally accepted
or not.
Security Parameter β. Clark and Hengartner provide a thorough analysis regarding the
security parameter β (size of the anonymity sets) in SELECTIONS [7]. The exact same
considerations can be applied for our approach. There are essentially three interesting
cases:
1. The anonymity set includes the entire voter roll, that is β = n. In this case, the
degree of coercion-resistance corresponds to JCJ, but vote authorization (or more
precisely fake vote elimination) is again quadratic in n (or more precisely multilin-
ear in n and N , see Table 3).
2. The anonymity set has a fixed size, for example β = 50. Clark and Hengartner
showed that a coercer may decide with small but non-negligible probability whether
or not the coerced voter complied with the instructions. Hence, if β is a constant
value, coercion-resistance is not given to the full, but depending on the value of β,
to a reasonable extent.
3. The size of the anonymity set varies among voters, but has a minimal size βi ≥ β,
for example βi ≥ 50. Clark and Hengartner point out the possibility of coerced
voters to place their real vote as stealth votes with βi = n. They also emphasize
that in this situation, they need to assume that other stealth votes are cast as well to
assure adversarial uncertainty.
Temporal Aspects. The security experiments of JCJ do not fully capture some important
temporal aspects. For example, it is assumed that all honest voters submit their ballots
in only one step (i.e., in parallel). In a more realistic setting, the coercer may observe
the order and time when the ballots arrive on the public bulletin board. Consider for
example the case where the coerced voter has only a short moment of privacy during
night time, when only few other voters are casting votes. Observing the public bulletin
board during this time, the coercer might get a strong indication whether or not the
coerced voter really complied. The problem is especially problematical in both SELEC-
TIONS and our approach, since the probability that the coerced voter appears in another
voter’s anonymity set might be low (depending on the actual choice of the security pa-
rameter β). To counteract the corresponding advantage for the coercer, we propose the
following extension to our approach:
1. Before casting the ballot, the voter encrypts the anonymity set with the public key
of the tallying authorities.
2. After eliminating duplicates, but before ballot replication, the ballots are mixed and
re-encrypted in an additional re-encryption mix-net (similar to Spycher et al.).
3. The tallying authorities jointly decrypt the anonymity sets included in the mixed
ballots.
Formal Proofs. Coercion-resistance of our protocol can be proved under the game-
based definition of Juels et al. [13]. Since our approach is close to the approach pre-
sented by Clark and Hengartner, their security games serve as a starting point for the
formal proofs, which we will carry out as future work.
4 Performance Comparison
This section is dedicated to a performance comparison of all the above introduced ap-
proaches. Our comparison excludes the one-time registration phase. In our results, the
number of registered voters is denoted by n, the number of submitted ballot by N , the
number of mixing and tallying authorities by T , the number of candidates by m, and
the size of the anonymity sets by β. We take the work of Clark and Hengartner [6, 7]
as a starting point and augment their findings with the performance properties of our
protocol and the one of Spycher et al. We make similar assumptions to facilitate a better
comparison:
– We only use standard ElGamal encryption over a modular multiplicative group of
integers (i.e., not the modified ElGamal version of JCJ).
– We only count the number of necessary modular exponentiations to perform the
respective tasks (i.e., all other arithmetic operations are neglected).
– We do not use techniques, which could equally improve the performance of all
protocols (e.g., the “blocking technique” of CIVITAS).
– We assume that a valid vote consists of exactly one candidate c ∈ C, wherem = |C|
denotes number of candidates.
– We assume that the re-encryption mix-nets use randomized partial checking [12]
for proving the correctness of the mixing (i.e., each authority mixes the encryptions
twice and half of these re-encryptions are checked).
– We assume that all encrypted votes are decrypted during the tallying phase (i.e., no
homomorphic tallying).
– We assume that all tallying authorities participate at the vote authorization phase
(e.g., distributed instead of threshold decryption or PET).
– We assume that all commitments in the distributed operations are based on hash
functions.
In contrast to Clark and Hengartner, we include the proofs of well-formedness of the
encrypted votes in our calculations. We also take the election setup of their protocol and
the tallying phase into consideration. For improving the readability of the results, we
have re-arranged the values for checking the proofs in a separate verification phase. To
simplify the results given in [6, 7], we consider only the worst case when all submitted
ballots reach the fake vote elimination phase. In other words, we assume that all sub-
mitted ballots contain valid proofs and that the ballot box contains no duplicate votes
(but searching for invalid and duplicate votes is still necessary). We also assume that
every registered voter has submitted at least one valid vote, i.e., the number of votes to
decrypt during tallying is exactly n and N ≥ n.
4.1 Performance Analysis
Table 2 and Table 3 summarize the results of the performance analysis. Table 2 is based
on corresponding values for the cryptographic primitives as given in Table 1, and Ta-
ble 3 shows the same results more compactly in Big-Oh notation. Note that some of
the values in Table 1 slightly differ from the ones given in [6, 7]. Since proving knowl-
edge of a plaintext requires only a proof of knowledge of the encryption randomness
Perform
Operation
Generate
Proof(s)
Verify
Proof(s)
Encryption: Standard ElGamal encryption with proof of knowledge of plaintext
(Schnorr).
2 1 2
Well-Formed Encryption: Standard ElGamal encryption of 1-out-of-m possible
plaintexts with proof of well-formedness (Chaum-Pederson, OR-composition).
2 4m− 2 4m
Re-Encryption: Standard ElGamal re-encryption with proof of correctness
(Chaum-Pederson).
2 2 4
Well-Formed Re-Encryption: Standard ElGamal re-encryption of 1-out-of-β
possible encryptions with proof of well-formedness (Chaum-Pederson).
2 4β − 2 4β
Mixing: Re-encryption and permutation ofN ciphertext tuples of length k. 2kN 2kN 4kN
Mix-Net: T authorities perform a re-encryption mix-net with randomized partial
checking (double re-encryption, but only half of the proofs are provided).
4kNT 2kNT 4kNT
Commitment: Applying an exponent with proof of knowledge (Schnorr). 1 1 2
Distributed Commitment: T authorities applying exponents with proofs of
knowledge (Schnorr).
T T 2T
Blinding: Applying an exponent on the ciphertext with proof of correctness
(Chaum-Pederson).
2 2 4
Distributed Blinding: T trustees applying exponents on the ciphertexts with
proofs of correctness (Chaum-Pederson).
2T 2T 4T
Decryption: Standard ElGamal decryption with proof of correctness (Chaum-
Pederson).
1 2 4
Distributed Decryption: T trustees performing distributed ElGamal decryptions
with proofs of correctness (Chaum-Pederson).
T 2T 4T
Plaintext Equivalence Test: Distributed blinding followed by distributed decryp-
tion.
3T 4T 8T
Table 1. Number of necessary exponentiations for various cryptographic primitives according to
the procedures as described in [5, 8, 16].
(Schnorr), it can be constructed with 1 and verified with 2 exponentiations. Proving
the correct decryption corresponds to proving a single equality of discrete logarithms
(Chaum-Pederson). In the distributed case with T authorities, this simply scales up to
T , 2T , and 4T exponentiations for performing the partial decryptions, constructing the
proofs, and verifying the proofs, respectively. Finally, a proof of encrypting 1-out-of-m
plaintexts requires 4m−2 exponentiations to construct (2 for the correct value and 4 for
every m−1 simulated values in the OR-composition) and 4m exponentiations to verify.
Similarly, proving the re-encryption of 1-out-of-β ciphertexts requires 4β−2 exponen-
tiations to construct and 4β to verify the proof. The results given in Table 2 are based on
these modifications, but they have no impact on the asymptotic results of Table 3. Note
that the performance of the final tallying by decrypting the valid votes in a distributed
way is the same in all protocols (nT exponentiations for performing the decryptions,
JCJ
(CIVITAS)
Araujo
et al.
Spycher
et al.
Clark et al.
(SELECTIONS)
Our
Protocol
Election Setup – – – (4n+2)T –
Vote Casting 4m+3 4m+13 4m+6 4β+4m+2 4m+3
Vote Authorization
Eliminate Invalid Votes (4m+2)N (4m+10)N (4m+4)N (4β+4m+2)N (4m+2)N
Insert Fake Votes – – 6βn – –
Elim. Duplicate Votes 72 (N
2−N)T 0 7(N+βn)T 0 7NT
1st Mixing of Ballots 12NT 30NT 18(N+βn)T 18NT 18βNT
2nd Mixing of Ballots – – 21(N+βn)T – –
Mixing of Credentials 6NT – – – –
Eliminate Fake Votes 7nNT (14T+6)N 7(N+βn)T 7NT 7βNT
Tallying 3nT 3nT 3nT 3nT 3nT
Verification
Election Setup – – – 4(n+1)T –
Eliminate Invalid Votes (4m+2)N (4m+10)N (4m+4)N (4β+4m+2)N (4m+2)N
Elim. Duplicate Votes 4(N2−N)T 0 8(N+βn)T 0 8NT
1st Mixing of Ballots 8NT 20NT 12(N+βn)T 12NT 12βNT
2nd Mixing of Ballots – – 16(N+βn)T – –
Mixing of Credentials 4NT – – – –
Eliminate Fake Votes 8nNT (16T+8)N 8(N+βn)T 8NT 8βNT
Tallying 4nT 4nT 4nT 4nT 4nT
Table 2. Performance comparison by counting the number of modular exponentiations required
in each phase.
2nT for constructing the proofs, and 4nT for verifying the proofs). More details about
the performance calculations are given in the upcoming paragraphs.
a) JCJ (CIVITAS). Vote casting consist of two encryptions (= 4) with one proof of
knowledge of plaintext (= 1) and one proof of well-formedness (= 4m−2). Vote au-
thorization requires verifying N proofs of knowledge (= 2N ) and N proofs of well-
formedness (= 4mN ) to eliminate invalid votes,
(
N
2
)
many PETs (= 32 (N
2−N)T )
with proofs (= 2(N2−N)T ) to eliminate duplicates, a re-encryption mix-net for N en-
cryption pairs (= 8NT ) with proofs (= 4NT ) to mix the ballots, a second re-encryption
mix-net for n single encryptions (= 4NT ) with proofs (= 2NT ) to mix the credentials,
JCJ
(CIVITAS)
Araujo
et al.
Spycher
et al.
Clark et al.
(SELECTIONS)
Our
Protocol
Election Setup – – – nT –
Vote Casting m m m β+m m
Vote Authorization N2T+nNT+mN NT+mN NT+βnT+mN NT+βN+mN βNT+mN
T,m = const. N2+nN N N+βn βN βN
Tallying nT nT nT nT nT
Verification N2T+nNT+mN NT+nT+mN NT+βnT+mN NT+βN+nT+mN βNT+nT+mN
T,m = const. N2+nN N+n N+βn βN + n βN + n
Table 3. Performance comparison by describing the asymptotic growth of the numbers of expo-
nentiations in each phase using the Big-Oh notation (relative to n, N , β, m, and T ).
and finally nN many PETs (= 3nNT ) with proofs (= 4nNT ) to eliminate fake votes.
Corresponding values for verifying the proofs follow accordingly.
b) Araujo et al. We use the latest version of the protocol for the comparison [3] and
adopt the analysis provided in [7]. Vote casting consists of four encryptions (= 8)
with three proofs of knowledge of plaintext (= 3) and one proof of well-formedness
(= 4m − 2). Two of the encrypted values and one of the non-encrypted values need
one exponentiation to compute (= 3). A proof of representation that relates the non-
encrypted to one of the encrypted values (= 1) is added to the ballot. To eliminate
invalid votes, vote authorization requires verifying 3N proofs of knowledge (= 6N ),
N proofs of well-formedness (= 4mN ), and N proofs of representation (= 4N ). Du-
plicates can be removed at no additional costs. As suggested in [7], we omit the addi-
tional encryption step, which can be performed by the first mix-net authority. The re-
encryption mix-net takes N encryption 5-tuples (= 30NT ) as input and produces cor-
responding proofs (= 20NT ). Finally, eliminating fake votes requires for each vote two
commitments (= 2N ), two Chaum-Pederson proofs (= 4N ), and two PETs (= 6NT )
with proofs (= 8NT ). Corresponding values for verifying the proofs follow accord-
ingly.
c) Spycher et al. Vote casting consist of three encryptions (= 6) with two proofs of
knowledge of plaintext (= 2) and one proof of well-formedness (= 4m−2). Vote
authorization requires verifying 2N proofs of knowledge (= 4N ) and N proofs of
well-formedness (= 4mN ) to eliminate invalid votes, three encryptions without proofs
for each of the βn inserted fake votes (= 6βn), N+βn many distributed blinding
operations (= 2(N+βn)T ) with proofs (= 2(N+βn)T ) and distributed decryptions
(= (N+βn)T ) with proofs (= 2(N+βn)T ) to eliminate duplicates (Smith’s and We-
ber’s scheme), a re-encryption mix-net for N+βn encryption triples (= 12(N+βn)T )
with proofs (= 6(N+βn)T ) to mix the ballots, N+βn distributed decryptions (=
(N+βn)T ) with proofs 2(N+βn)T plus another re-encryption mix-net forN+βn en-
cryption triples (= 12(N+βn)T ) with proofs (= 6(N+βn)T ) to mix the ballots a sec-
ond time, and finally N+βn many PETs (= 3(N+βn)T ) with proofs (= 4(N+βn)T )
to eliminate fake votes. Corresponding values for verifying the proofs follow accord-
ingly.
d) Clark et el. (SELECTIONS). The election setup requires n distributed blinding op-
erations (= 2nT ), one distributed commitment (= T ) and an AND-composition of
corresponding proofs (= 2nT + T ). Vote casting consist of a commitment (= 1) with
a proof of knowledge (= 1), a re-encryption (= 2) with a proof of well-formedness
(= 4β − 2), and one encryption (= 2) with a proof of well-formedness (= 4m−2).
Vote authorization requires a re-encryption mix-net forN encryption triples (= 12NT )
with proofs (= 6NT ) to mix the ballots, and finally N many PETs (= 3NT ) with
proofs (= 4NT ) to eliminate fake votes. Corresponding values for verifying the proofs
follow accordingly.
e) Our Protocol. Vote casting consist of two encryptions (= 4) with one proof of
knowledge of plaintext (= 1) and one proof of well-formedness (= 4m−2). Vote au-
thorization requires verifying N proofs of knowledge (= 2N ) and N proofs of well-
formedness (= 4mN ) to eliminate invalid votes, N many distributed blinding opera-
tions (= 2NT ) with proofs (= 2NT ) and distributed decryptions (= NT ) with proofs
(= 2NT ) to eliminate duplicates (Smith’s and Weber’s scheme), a re-encryption mix-
net for βN encryption triples (= 12βNT ) with proofs (= 6βNT ) to mix the ballots,
and finally βN many PETs (= 3βNT ) with proofs (= 4βNT ). Corresponding values
for verifying the proofs follow accordingly.
4.2 Discussion
In our new protocol, casting a vote is as efficient as in the original JCJ protocol or in
CIVITAS. For a fixed candidate set, a constant number of exponentiations is needed. If
the candidate set is reasonably small, this seems to be feasible on today’s typical client
platforms (e.g., 11 exponentiations are needed for m = 2 choices in a referendum).
Compared to SELECTIONS, where casting a vote depends on the security parameter β,
this is the main advantage of our approach. We think that for reasonably large anonymity
sets, the protocol of Clark et al. is not competitive enough to be considered as a solu-
tion for a coercion-resistant voting system (e.g., 210 exponentiations are needed for
β = 50 and m = 2). Asymptotically, the number of exponentiations is O(β+m) for
SELECTIONS and O(m) for all the others (see Table 3).
To determine the protocol with the most efficient vote authorization procedure, for
example by interpreting the general asymptotic results in Table 3, we need to take into
account multiple systems parameters. To facilitate this task, we propose two simplifi-
cations: we consider a constant number of authorities and a fixed candidate set (both T
and m affect all protocols in a similar way). The corresponding simplified growth rates
are shown in Table 3 below the general results. While JCJ and CIVITAS are essentially
quadratic in N , it turns out that Araujo et al.’s protocol—although it has relatively high
constant factors—is the only one that is truly linear in N . Among the others, the ad-
vantage of Spycher et al’s protocol is the fact that β only multiplies with n, the number
of voters, which is fixed for a given election (whereas the number of submitted ballots
N has no upper bound). On the other hand, Spycher et al’s protocol has the least fa-
vorable constant factors among all. Our new protocol and SELECTIONS are comparable
with respect to their growth rates, but SELECTIONS has a significantly lower constant
factor for βN . However, SELECTIONS allows to carry out the invalid votes elimination
already during the vote casting phase, which is a considerable advantage compared to
our protocol. Note that the same conclusions hold for the verification procedure.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a new improvement of the JCJ protocol that allows efficient vote
authorization without requiring more computation power on the voter’s side. Concep-
tually, it is a mix between the existing protocols of Spycher et al. and SELECTIONS. To
conclude this paper, we summarize the phases with emphasis on vote authorization and
compare our protocol with the different approaches discussed in this paper.
Election Setup. In contrast to SELECTIONS, our protocol as well as the other examined
protocols require no election setup.
Vote Casting. Compared with the protocol of Spycher et al. we do not require the
authorities to generate random fake votes during the vote casting phase and therefore
we reduce the effort for the authorities in this phase. In contrast to SELECTIONS, our
improvement introduces no additional effort for the voter in terms of modular expo-
nentiations. The voter only has to add a set of β voter roll indices to the ballot. When
applied on systems and technologies with limited computing resources such as mobile
phones or web applications using JavaScript, all additional performance requirements
are undesirable. Another advantage of our approach is the fact, that security parameter
β does not affect the client-side at all. We believe that security should not be bounded
by the computing equipment of the individual voters or even require them to buy better
computers to protect their privacy or an e-voting protocol to a reasonable degree. More-
over, this contradicts the fundamental principle of equality. In our approach β only
affects the server-side performance requirements which is more scalable with respect to
computation power.
Vote Authorization. The lower computation requirements for the voters during the vote
casting phase yield more effort to put in the vote authorization phase. Security param-
eter β affects the computational requirements on the server-side as a linear factor. In
particular, we need to explicitly remove duplicates using the linear approach of Smith
and Weber and we enlarge the input of the mix-net by factor β. Hence, mixing in our
protocol requires additional computing power compared to the other protocols.
Current and Future Work. Since our protocol strongly relates to existing proven
concepts, we informally justified the correctness of the individual phases. However,
future work includes formal proofs of correctness of these arguments. Currently, we
are engaged in developing prototypes for various coercion-resistant voting protocols.
Our experience with these realizations will allow us to compare the existing approaches
from a more practical perspective.
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